source of rigidity or protection for family law litigants? Does the new system permit the flexibility needed to tailor decisions to the needs of vastly different families? Or does the new regime's broad discretion jeopardize fundamental fairness with informal, inconsistent, and unreviewable decisions?12
The proliferation of problem-solving courts around the country has gained widespread media attention. \3 Policymakers have also offered commentary on their efficacy in addressing a wider range of social ills. 14 But there has been little critical analysis of the broader question of whether this profound shift in our justice system is sound. If, as many concede, the adversary system fails families in variety of ways, do we address its deficiencies or dramatically change its mission? In their zeal to address the social problems that bring people to court, have the reformers given appropriate weight to the values underlying the traditional legal system? And have they adequately explored the risks of the new paradigm, particularly on low-income litigants?
This Article addresses these questions and reframes the debate about problem-solving courts by evaluating the relative benefits of the therapeutic and adversarial approaches in resolving family conflicts. 12. See generally Problem Solving Courts, supra note 6. The debate about the constitutionality of problem solving courts has just begun to reach the courts, primarily in the context of due process challenges to drug courts hearing criminal cases. The cases decided thus far have just begun to explore the issue. See Part One of this Article describes the changes that have contributed to this paradigm shift in family law. Part Two explores the profound ways the shift alters the traditional adversary system and the risks presented by these shifts.
Finally, this Article concludes that before we fundamentally alter the mission and structure of the justice system we must address the deficiencies in the adversary system. It offers proposals to strengthen the adversary system in family law while incorporating selected elements of the problem-solving courts to design a justice system that serves all families.
II. A PARADIGM SHIFT

I5
An overarching theme of family law reform efforts is that the adversary system is ill-suited to resolving disputes involving children.!6 The primary critique by reformers begins by noting that traditional child access proceedings embody adversarial norms intended to minimize direct communication between parties and maximize the courts' role in decisionmaking. Divorce or custody actions are initiated by a lawsuit naming a plaintiff and a defendant, and settlement negotiations are conducted in the "shadow of the law."!7 Parties, if represented and advised by lawyers, reach agreements by making difficult predictions about who will "win" at trial. Under prevailing legal standards, the party who prevails is the parent who most successfully depicts the other parent as unfit, or who can most effectively assign blame for the parties failed relationship.
Reformers accurately note that the acrimony between parents engendered by this system harms children. Social science research over the last two decades has made a strong case that children's well-being following parental breakup depends upon their parents' behavior during and after the separation process. 18 Much of the research concludes that the higher the levels of parental conflict to which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family 17. The phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the law" has become part of the language of negotiation and dispute resolution and refers to the role the law might play in reminding parties of a predicted court outcome and thus encouraging settlement. Similarly, where the law is indeterminate and has no predictive value, the law does little to promote settlements. The dissolution. 19 All of these circumstances have led to a call by reformers to abandon the adversary paradigm, in favor of more informal approaches with the goal of encouraging parents to develop positive post-divorce coparenting relationships. Nonadversary dispute resolution approaches adopted in newly developed family courts range from relatively wellestablished court-connected mediation in divorce-related custody cases 20 to family group conferencing and other problem-solving approaches in child welfare proceedingsY Some lawyers have embraced the new approaches through "collaborative lawyering" in which lawyers pledge at the outset of their representation not to take a client's case to tria1. 22 As two leading reformers recently stated, "in the last quarter century, the process of resolving legal family disputes has, both literally and metaphorically, moved from confrontation toward collaboration and from the courtroom to the conference room.,, 23 Another element of the paradigm shift is the reconception of family disputes from legal events to social and emotional events. 24 These recharacterized family disputes, reform advocates argue, require "collaborative," "holistic," and "interdisciplinary" interventions rather than zealous advocacy. 25 regime and the role of mental health professionals and nonprofessional court staff has become more prominent. A related development is the change in goals and ambitions for family court proceedings. The goal of granting parties legal remedies such as custody, divorce, and financial support has been supplanted by the goal of providing families before the court a "holistic assessment of the family's legal and social needs ... to devise more comprehensive legal remedies.,,26 Many of these developments may hold promise for families in conflict who seek legal remedies to disputes. Using the legal system to assign fault for divorce or to resolve child access disputes using indeterminate standards like "best interests of the child" often results in flawed decisions that take too much time and, if they can afford lawyers and other litigation expenses, costs families too much money.27 And, as I have argued elsewhere, the traditional adversary system will continue to fail most parties as long as they are without lawyers or legal advice, given family law's complex system of procedural rules and broad discretionary standards. 28
The new paradigm offers an alternative to the flawed adversary system for families who must resort to the court for legal remedies. But important questions should be explored before we fully embrace the new reforms. In a system where fully half of family law litigants are unrepresented in court, have we . fully tested the effectiveness of the adversary system to resolve family conflicts?29 What values embedded in the adversary system must be maintained in any family justice system to preserve the basic procedural and substantive fairness we require of our legal system?30 And what impact would it have on low-income families to embrace some or all of the elements of the "therapeutic regime,,?31 Is there an alternative to the new family court's ambitious agenda that will improve the adversary system's ability to perform its essential dispute resolution function? The remainder of this Article addresses these questions.
III. THE CAUTIONARY TALE
Although the dramatic shifts in family dispute resolution have been underway for over a decade, scholars and family policymakers have engaged in little critical analysis of the risks and potential negative consequences of such change. This subpart explores these concerns by examining the limits of courts' institutional competence, the surrender of fact-finding and decisionmaking to individuals without legal training, and the disjunction between alternative dispute resolution and established legal norms.
A. Do Family Courts Have the "Institutional Competence" to Achieve the Goals of Reformers?
Institutions called "family courts" began appearing as early as the 1900s,32 and a Standard Family Court Act was circulating in the 1950s.
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But the new model of a unified family court with expanded services and programs for both child welfare and divorce and child access cases did not begin to be established around the country in significant numbers until the 1990s. 34 As a result, there is limited empirical data, positive or negative, of these courts' impact on the families they serve. But a few observations about how these courts operate in both theory and practice, how families experience these courts, and the impact of economics on that experience are possible at this time. Although families may benefit from the capacity-building and problem-solving approaches embraced in the new paradigm, most courts are not competent to provide these services. Court-based procedures have historically been designed to determine facts and enforce norms. The model family court movement has sought to expand this function with a complex, ambitious agenda to address both the legal and nonlegal problems of families who come before them seeking dispute resolution. While the goals of the court system have expanded substantially, the structural changes contemplated in even the ideal courts may not be sufficient to meet the ambitious agenda and transform courts' traditional functions. 35 Courts with their "limited remedial imaginations, may not be the best institutional settings for resolving" the nonlegal issues proponents wish to place within their authority.36 As a result, the restructured family courts may be incapable of achieving the formidable task of "provid[ing] coordinated holistic services ... to address the physical and mental needs of the family.,,37
In addition to problems adjusting to the proposed change in goals and function, state court dockets, particularly the family law docket, continue to grow and resources continue to decline. 38 Recruiting, 35 . The ideal unified family court has been defined as having the following components: (I) comprehensive subject-matter jurisdiction over family-related legal matters; (2) a "one family, one team" assignment system, designed to ensure that all matters affecting a family are handled by a single judge or judicial team; (3) an emphasis on interdisciplinary training and collaboration; and (4) the provision and coordination of a comprehensive range of court-connected family services. Catherine J. Ross The Family Court model court movement is barely five years old, and these courts are just beginning to realize the complexity of their endeavor. Reading what the courts engaged in this experiment say about themselves reveals a mixture of shock and optimism: shock at how hard change is to accomplish, and optimism after seeing real differences in outcomes for families and children. It is also apparent that some of their earliest efforts were procedurally-oriented just to get them started. Those steps have resulted in administrative restructuring and procedural mechanisms for problem-solving that can now be applied to the substantive mandates of the model court movement, an even harder task to accomplish.
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Asking a court system to take on these tasks may detract from its fundamental role as a forum for fair and authoritative dispute resolution.
4o Scarce resources would be spread even more thinly and some courts may have difficulty meeting both basic conflict resolution functions and the broader and more ambitious goals of the new family courtS. 41 A recent study examining the impact of establishing family divisions in one state demonstrates the difficulty in delivering the promised services to more than a small percentage of litigants before the court. 42 And, as more fully explained below, making good on the broad promise of reform for even a handful of parties may come at a substantial cost to long held values of due process, family privacy, and autonomy.
B. The Surrender of Fact-Finding and Decisionmaking to Nonlawyers
The new paradigm for family law decisionmaking contemplates a substantial change in the roles of lawyers and judges. Some commentators see a different, but expanded, role for these players in the new system. 43 But most commentary and much of the change already implemented endorses the significantly expanded role of nonlegal staff rather than lawyers in the new family court. Such staff "manage cases," provide court-connected services, and assist fact finders and decisionmakers in reaching settlements or decisions. 44 One family court proponent has described the need for an expanded role for these new players in the system to provide:
[A] high level of administrative organization both to manage cases and to coordinate services. The court management system, including nonjudicial personnel, must aim to resolve disputes in a timely manner, to supply and to coordinate efficiently the necessary resources or services, and to network appropriately with other courts in the system to share information about families that allows for consistent judicial child access proceedings in the new model courts. In tenns of child protection cases, expanded use of nonlegal personnel can be attributed to two trends prevalent in such courts. First, there has always been "a subtle dynamic" that:
arises on a day-to-day level in these cases, due in part to the prevalence of social work discourse and the tendency of the participants to view these cases in therapeutic rather than legalistic terms. This dynamic implicitly suppresses rights talk and discourages the participants from taking advantage of those procedural protections that do exist. 47 Second, the family court movement has contributed to the expansion of infonnal, nonadversarial alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in child welfare cases. 48 As a result, social workers, child protection staff, and other nonlegal actors playa central role in decisions about removal and placement of children where abuse or neglect is alleged. As discussed more fully in subpart III.D infra, the danger for families, primarily poor, involved in these proceedings is that disregard for statutory and constitutional nonns will result in extensive state involvement in family life by nonjudicial personnel before any judicial detennination of abuse or neglect justifying such involvement. And decisions will be made in infonnal settings based on the evaluations, however flawed, of staff with few standards guiding these decisions and little or no opportunity for review.
The model family court has also expanded the role of nonlawyers in private family disputes where the state is not a party, particularly those involving divorce, child custody, and visitation. The nonlegal personnel in these cases include expanded roles for professional staff drawn from mental health and social work backgrounds with relatively established roles such as mediators and custody evaluators. 49 They also include staff with new titles and somewhat less established roles such as "parenting coordinators,"So "early neutral evaluators,,,SI and "family law 47 facilitators."s2 Finally, the new family court, at least as experienced in some court systems, continues a pattern well entrenched in its predecessor courts, of vesting enonnous power in nonprofessional staff such as clerks, custody investigators, case managers, and, in many cases, mediators. s3
As early as the late 1980s, a few commentators were beginning to recognize the shift in both the rhetoric and decisionmaking in family disputes, particularly in the child access area. Martha Fineman, in an early and much cited article,s4 noted that the "professional language of the social workers and mediators has progressed to become the public, then the political, then the dominant rhetoric. It now defines the tenns of contemporary discussions about custody and effectively excludes or minimizes contrary ideologies and concepts."ss She attributed this shift, in part, to the willingness of judges and lawyers to cede authority because of their feelings of inadequacy to make judgments about the best interests of children-the existing legal standard in child custody decisions.
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Recognizing the problems associated with leaving child access cases to an adversarial system making decisions under a best interests standard, Professor Fineman nonetheless cautioned against "turn[ing] over the decisionmaking task to another professional groUp."S7 Though these nonlegal professionals are considered neutral, in her view, they have a bias in favor of joint custody, regardless of the case's circumstances.
58 Judicial deference to agreements or recommendations from these processes poses risks to primary parents and their children. themselves as neutral, nonadversarial decisionrnakers in contrast to attorneys, whom they characterize as both adversarial and combative. Yet social workers are not neutral; they have a professional bias in favor of a specific substantive result. That result benefits their profession by creating the need for mediation and counseling. It is this bias and self-interest that makes the process one for political consideration. The bias inherent in mediation is different from, but no less suspect than, the bias that can result from overt favoritism of one party over another.").
Instead, she argued for a return to a legal model in custody cases that protects and recognizes the role of the parent assuming care for the child and proposed the "primary parent" rule to implement this goa1.
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Other more recent critiques of growing reliance on nonlegal personnel to make custody decisions raise concerns about the bases for such "expert" opinions. Tippins and Whitman, a family law attorney and a psychologist, argue that while forensic psychological assessments 60 are often "pivotal documents" that form the basis of judicial decisions on child access, they fail to meet ethical and scientific standards of both psychology and law:
Indeed, there is probably no forensic question on which overreaching by mental health professionals has been so common and so egregious. Besides lacking scientific validity, such opinions have often been based on clinical data that are, on their face, irrelevant to the legal questions in dispute. Indeed, whatever position one might take on the ultimate issue rule with respect to other species of expert testimony, such opinions by mental health witnesses on the ultimate question of a child's best interest ought not to be allowed. . .. The best interests standard is a legal and socio-moral construct, not a psychological construct. There is no empirically supportable method or principle by which an evaluator can come to a conclusion with respect to best interests entirely by resort to the knowledge base of the mental health profession. Others have noted that this critique can also be applied, perhaps more forcefully, to the range of nonlegal and nonprofessional staff who often conduct custody investigations and assist courts in reaching custody decisions:
[C]ustody evaluators are more likely to make inferences and recommendations from unsubstantiated theory, personal values and experiences, and cultural and personal biases. Our own observations and reviews of evaluations over several decades lead us to the same conclusion. Common examples include unexamined strong beliefs in the primacy of mothers (or essentiality of fathers) regardless of the circumstances, biased perception of their clients derived from their own negative marital and divorce experiences, or a conviction that joint physical custody benefits (or harms) all children. 62 Criticism of increased reliance on nonjudicial personnel also stems from the often unclear ethical standards that govern such personnel's behavior. While nonlawyer mediators may be bound by court rules or statutes requiring mediator confidentiality, prohibiting testimony in court, or ex parte contacts with judges about mediation sessions,63 not all states have such rules. Indeed, some state statutes authorize mediators to make recommendations to the court if mediation fails. 64 The ethical obligations of staff with roles such as "custody evaluators" or "parenting coordinators" are even less clear. Commentators have raised concerns about the practices of such staff in both obtaining information about parties and sharing such information with judges and others. 65 These concerns exist when parties are represented by counsel and court personnel do not appropriately consult with counsel before giving "advice" to parties or seeking information from them 66 These concerns are even greater when parties are unrepresented and have little understanding of the relative authority of various players in the family court system. 67 (2005) 
C. The Disjunction Between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Legal Norms
A centerpiece of the new paradigm in family decisionmaking is the expanded use of alternative dispute resolution and, in particular, mediation. The use of mediation in divorce and related child access disputes is relatively established but has grown exponentially as courtmandated family mediation has spread in the new family courtS. 68 Most recently, use of mediation or "family conferencing" has spread into child welfare cases. 69 Encouraged by judges and court administrators who welcome both the reduction of cases on their dockets and relief from making difficult child placement decisions, mediation continues to grow throughout the family court system.
It is difficult to underestimate the sea change in family dispute resolution when moving from the courtroom to the mediation room. Like many of the reforms, mediation presents both possibilities and risks as an alternative to a legal system suffused with the norms of traditional advocacy. There is no fact finder or decision maker apart from the parties in mediation. Rather, a mediator "facilitates" the parties in resolving their own disputes.?O Mediating parties "may address any issue they wish, not limited to legal causes of action; they may bring in any information they wish, not limited by rules of evidence and procedure to probative evidence, relevant to legal causes of action and meeting evidentiary requirements for authenticity and accuracy."? 1 Even in court-based programs, the sessions are private and informal with few rules governing the scope of discussions or exchange of information, other than mediator-developed rules of courtesy. Legal norms play a very limited role. While laws regarding child support formula may be mentioned, in mediation of child access issues, and to some extent, marital property and alimony, parties are encouraged to generate their own norms that guide the resolution to their dispute.72
In appropriate cases, mediation can empower parties, enhance their ability to work together in the future, and promote flexible and creative 68 . DIVORCE problem-solving. It has particular value in family disputes where strengthening, rather than harming relationships in the dispute resolution process is important because of the need for ongoing relationships to coparent children after family breakup.73 But participation in mediation also poses a serious risk that parties may waive important legal rights or enter agreements that exacerbate conflict. This is particularly true when mediators are ill-equipped or poorly trained. 74 Bad mediators can do great harm--especially to vulnerable parties-when the "empowering" promise of mediation can instead become an exercise in coercion and arm-twisting. 75 This risk is particularly acute without appellate review, a public record, or established grievance procedures that, at least in theory, provide a check on the risk of "bad" judging.
The risks of mediation increase when parties are encouraged or ordered to participate in mediation and lack information about legal norms. Attorneys have not traditionally played a central role in mediation. Unless confronted with a court order for mediation, attorneys rarely mention mediation as an option for clients facing family breakup, either through divorce or child welfare proceedings. 76 Although some quickly recognized the important role attorneys can play in both preparing clients for mediation, and in the mediation sessions themselves,77 the prevailing view is that attorneys have little or no role to play in mediation. 78 But the risk of loss of rights in the mediation process is significantly greater for unrepresented parties. 79 Even if the attorney does not attend the mediation, the represented party has far greater access to an expert source of information about judicial proceedings, each party's legal rights and remedies, and the parties' chances of success in court. The unrepresented party has no comparable source of information when a "neutral" mediator facilitates an agreement. One scholar described his view of the potential harm for unrepresented litigants in court-sponsored mediation programs:
From a mediator's point of view, the [neutral role of mediator] flows naturally from the concept of mediation, a process voluntarily selected by the parties as a means of dispute resolution different from an adversarial trial. From an unrepresented litigant's point of view, however, the effect of the rules can be devastating. The pressure exerted by courts to send cases to mediation and the lack of explanation of the mediation process raise serious questions about the "voluntary" nature of the decision to mediate. Once in mediation, the pressures on mediators to obtain settlements are immense. With a large number of unrepresented litigants, this pressure guarantees that mediators will rarely, if ever, exercise the option to terminate the mediation due to the incapacity of an unrepresented litigant to participate. . .. In mediated settlements, the routine waiver of rights by unrepresented litigants flows from presumptions that the choice to mediate is voluntary and informed; that the litigant has a realistic opportunity to obtain counsel and chooses to forego counsel; that the litigant has access to independent advice; and that the litigant appears in mediation aware of her legal rights and capable of participating in mediation .... In theory, judges could provide a check on the dangers identified above in mediation, because mediated agreements are usually sent to them for approval. In reality, judges typically rubber-stamp agreements reached in mediation. The risks of mediation are also heightened when one party is less powerful than the other.
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Lack of formal procedures; confidential, private setting; focus on the parties' "needs" rather than "rights" under substantive family law; and virtual lack of review of both the process and outcome of mediation create a setting where the more powerful may dominate, and bias and prejudice are unchecked. 82 Power imbalances may exist where only one party is represented by an attorney or may result from race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and cultural differences in mediation. 83 The most disabling power imbalance in mediation may be where domestic violence has taken place. In these cases, there has already been a severe abuse of power and the consequent power imbalance can make mediation impossible. A consensus has emerged that cases involving family violence need special treatment in mediation, reflected in both standards for mediators 84 and mediation statutes and rules. 81. One of the earliest articulations of this position is the often-cited article by Trina Grillo, supra note 75. Of course, some mediators argue that just opposite is true: mediation is particularly appropriate for relationships marked by power imbalances, particularly gender. They argue that the hierarchical, "winner takes all" approach of a still white, male dominated adversary system further disempowers and silences the less powerful. The delays, expense, complexity, and inflexibility of litigation make it particularly well-suited to resolving family law disputes. Mediation, on the other hand, with its emphasis on listening, relationships, and problem-solving has greater potential to "heal" and "hear" all voices. Further, mediation's focus on permitting participants to express emotions and articulate needs may be better suited to women than men. Its procedural informality, lack of reliance on substantive rules of law, and lower cost might make it more accessible to those who cannot afford lawyers and are not well versed in the American justice system. [I]nformal procedures are unlikely overall to be as successful as formal ones in meeting the outcome and process goals of due process. The substantial power disparity between the parties, the emotionally charged nature of the subject matter, and the lack of a shared set of interests and values between the parties all tend to distort the decision making process. Traditional formal adversarial processes have mechanisms that, while far from perfect, are designed to combat the distortion caused by such abuse throughout the mediation process." Id. Another group of distinguished academics, judges and practicing lawyers, the American Law Institute (ALI), has also addressed mediating family disputes where domestic violence is present. In its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI takes the position that the risks of coercion and intimidation in mediation for victims of domestic violence require that all mediation programs be voluntary. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.07(2). 85. Courts and legislatures have responded to the consensus that domestic violence cases should be given special treatment in mediation by enacting a variety of rules and statutes to achieve that goal. As of 2004, forty two states had enacted statewide statutes or court rules authorizing mandatory, discretionary, or voluntary court-sponsored mediation programs of selected family law disputes. Of the forty-two statutes or rules, twenty-nine create some kind of exception to the court's authority. Jane C. conditions. But informality generally offers no equivalent protections.
Murphy
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Much of the research evaluating the concerns raised here about mediation is conflicting. The research addressing these concerns in family mediation tends to show different results depending on a number of factors including the type of issues mediated (custody or financial issues), whether process or outcomes are examined, and whether the parties have experienced both litigation and mediation. 93 One difficulty in evaluating family mediation is measuring "success.,,94 Given mediation's focus on "needs" rather than "rights," measuring participant "satisfaction" has been the dominant and appropriate measure of success. Minorities and other traditionally less powerful groups may, however, have lower expectations about how well their needs can be met, thus rendering "satisfaction" an inadequate measure for these individuals. "Fairness" in both process and outcome instead of "satisfaction" should also factor into the "success" of these new forms of alternative dispute resolution in child welfare cases.
D. The Impact of the New Paradigm on Low-Income Families
The Loss of Legal Rights and Privacy
The previous subparts have discussed a range of concerns about the move from the adversary system to "therapeutic" intervention in family law. Many of the elements of the new paradigm--compulsory mediation of disputes, reliance on nonlegal staff, and relaxation of procedural protections-pose greater risks for poor people. First, there is a risk that the new approach will deprive poor litigants of their legal rights. This risk results from many circumstances. First, these procedures and investigations are largely informal and lack the safeguards built into the adversary system. 95 The threat of loss of rights is heightened for poor litigants who most often appear without lawyers and therefore lack the protection afforded by lawyers in this unchartered territory.96 Further, there is evidence that when these services are 94. Waldman, supra note 72, at 765 (finding that the difficulty in measuring "success" is in part because different mediation models place "a different weight and emphasis on the values of fairness, disputant autonomy, social justice, and self-determination"). . There is growing concern about the risk that mediation will become justice "on the cheap" for the poor. While the "second class" justice concerns usually focus on court-ordered mediation versus litigation, there is growing concern that vast differences in quality may develop between private, voluntary mediation and public, court ordered mediation. To the extent parties have resources, they will tend to choose their own mediators and opt out of court-based programs. The remaining cases sent to mediation from the ever expanding family law docket will be predominately poor, unrepresented litigants who have no choices and will experience the mediation equivalent of the "mass justice" oflow-income courts. 98. See Ross, supra note 35, at 13. 99. Murphy, supra note 46, at 707--09 (analyzing the treatment of mothers in a range of legal proceedings involving children and noting " [B] ecause mothers overwhelmingly are the custodians and caretakers of children, they are, in most cases, the focus of the state's intervention in cases of allegations of child abuse or neglect. As noted, from their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor children.").
See supra
100. Although there is variation among standards for state intervention, the language of state statutes generally allows intervention based on abandonment; physical, sexual, or emotional "abuse"; or failure to protect a child from abuse or educational or medical neglect. bureaucracy,IOI have led to well-documented victimization of poor women under this system. 102 The family court movement's increased reliance on informal procedures like family group conferencing l03 increases the risk of unchecked state intervention, and threatens due process in these cases. One practitioner described these new procedures for resolving allegations of child abuse and neglect:
[I]nfonnal processes replace the initial factual adjudication of whether acts of abuse or neglect warranting state intervention actually occurred with a free-ranging family therapy session. There is virtually no limit on the topics that can be discussed nor on the people who may be invited to join. Mediation programs typically give discretion to the mediator to invite people who are not parties to the case, including foster parents, extended family members, and members of the "community," such as a local church pastor. Once these people are brought to the table, all become equal participants, entitled to have their "concerns" heard and their "needs" met. Rather than seeking to detennine the truth of the allegations of abuse or neglect, the focus of the discussion becomes "[f1inding solutions which meet the competing needs and interests of all parties." Suddenly, the needs and interests of foster parents, aunts, uncles, grandparents, and social workers are placed on an equal footing with those of the parents and children. But before the family is forced to participate in therapy, the process is supposed to first make a determination as to whether state intervention is warranted. This stage has been skipped. In essence, the mediation session becomes the very state intrusion that the proceeding is supposed to determine whether or not to allow in the first place. 104
The new regime is raising similar concerns for low-income families in proceedings involving divorce and child access. The risk of due process violations and loss of privacy in family life has increased under the new system with more ambitious goals for intervention and the roles of both judges and nonjudicial personnel have changed. As noted, a principle component of the new family court is the goal of having one judge hear all matters involving a single family.105 This may result in both more informed and more efficient decisionmaking. 106 But it may also result in judges having access to information about a family that would be inadmissible in traditional adversarial proceedings. Judges might also reach decisions in one proceeding based upon conclusions reached in another. 107 In addition, a judge's role in the new "problem-solving" family court has shifted from the more narrow role of resolving disputes to the less defined, and potentially broader, role of using the court's authority "to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to monitor [the parties']compliance and progress."IOS The latter role creates a greater risk of unwarranted intervention in traditionally private spheres of family life.
In addition to the risk of loss of privacy and due process posed by judges in the new family courts, the wide range of nonjudicial courtsponsored actors and services in these courts pose similar risks. Given the goal of addressing both the perceived legal and nonlegal needs of families, parties seeking remedies like divorce or child support may be required to comply with orders or referrals for parenting classes, 109 substance abuse or mental health evaluations, I 10 custody evaluations, III family mediation, 112 and other similar "services."
Many commentators and practitioners have described bias in the legal system against the poor, particularly in their roles as parents.
l13 This may trigger greater scrutiny and intrusion of the kind embraced by this regime-required attendance at parenting education, mental health evaluations, continuing oversight by parenting coordinators, custody evaluators, and other newly created players in the family justice system. The requirement that family members participate in services may even extend to victims of domestic violence seeking protection and other legal remedies in a family court focused on "problem solving.,,114 To avoid "losing sight of the victim," many of these courts include the battered parent in orders for counseling and other services. I 15 "Services" in these contexts require significant disclosure of personal information by family members with few rules or procedures to protect the scope of the information sought or, in some instances, the limits of its dissemination. In some cases, such orders may even undermine the goals of family safety as in the domestic violence context where a batterer may continue control over the victim by bringing contempt actions or otherwise using court orders for victim services as a way to manipulate the victim.
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For all these reasons, court ordered participation in these programs burdens families' privacy and encroaches upon their autonomy.
Those with resources have opportunities to limit court involvement in family breakup and its consequences. When a court orders mediation, parties may be able to bypass court-sponsored programs.
Their attorneys can object to mediation, negotiate directly with opposing counsel, or choose a private mediator.
ll7 Similarly, when parties can pay for services such as custody evaluation, courts will often allow them to substitute their own experts for the court's staff. 118 Further, the parties with attorneys often have negotiated agreements and can present them at the first court proceeding. In this way, they avoid referrals for services and remain "under the court's radar." For families who try to navigate the system without lawyers or resources for "outside" experts or services, involvement in the web of interventions in the new family court is almost impossible to avoid if they seek legal remedies, such as custody orders and child support. The following subpart illustrates how these potential risks play out when poor families bring their disputes to the new family courts.
115. Zorza, supra note 114, at 47.
/d.
117. Statistics from one court system support the need for concern that court sponsored "services" 118. Allegra, supra note 49, at 12 (as one custody evaluator described the process, "[w]hen [custody evaluation is warranted] the couple might agree to a private Custody Evaluation, performed by a psychologist, retained for this purpose. The clients' attorneys are often instrumental in helping their clients identify a psychologist, who is experienced in performing this type of evaluation. When there is no agreement to perform a private custody evaluation, but the psychological issue still exists as an impediment to custody-visitation arrangements, the court steps in and orders it own Custody Evaluation").
Maryland's Experience
a. Introduction
Maryland was among a small group of states to explore new ways to handle family law matters by establishing family divisions in its five largest jurisdictions by court rule in 1998.119 Although Maryland did not adopt all components of the model family court,120 the courts embarked on an ambitious experiment to approach family law decisionmaking from a "therapeutic, holistic, and ecological" perspective "with the aim of improving the lives of families and children and maximizing the potential positive outcomes of court intervention.,,121 The system was designed by an array of impressive and thoughtful jurists, scholars, and practitioners.
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Great care was invested in creating performance standards to measure the new reforms' impacts.
Indeed, some evaluation of the family division has already taken place over the eight years since it was first established and there is every indication the judiciary in Maryland is committed to continuing the system's evaluation, oversight, and improvement. As such, the Maryland Family Divisions present a particularly good court system from which to draw examples of both the promise and risks of the new paradigm.
As with similar efforts around the country, the planned reforms in the Family Divisions in Maryland have been difficult to achieve. The change that has taken place has come at a cost, particularly regarding family privacy and autonomy for low-income families. The court system has made some effort to evaluate the performance of courts' components. 123 But the negative impact on poor litigants' privacy and 119. MD. R. 16-204. 120. The Family Division is assigned fairly comprehensive jurisdiction matters including dissolution of marriage, child custody, visitation, alimony, spousal support, child support, establishment and termination of party -child relationship, criminal nonsupport, desertion, name changes, guardianship of minors and disabled person, involuntary admission to state facilities, family legal-medical issues, domestic violence, and some juvenile causes but did not adopt the "one judge, one family" principle. autonomy has not been analyzed and is difficult to capture in such evaluations.
Most parties entering the Family Divisions are unrepresented, making them particularly vulnerable to the risk of abuses of power within the court system. 124 Many of these litigants have no experience with the court system and thus have limited ability to distinguish requests from nonjudicial actors to participate voluntarily in programs from judicial authority to compel action. For those who regularly experience the state social service bureaucracy in other contexts-those who may have experienced the punitive power of child support, welfare, and child protection bureaucracies-the impulse to comply with requests from anyone within the courthouse is strong. Even with counsel, few "offers" for services are declined and judicial or nonjudicial exercises of authority are rarely challenged. 125 The following examples from two jurisdictions in Maryland illustrate the dangers of this system. 126
b. Case #1: The Risk of "Post Judgment Monitoring,,127
Mrs. Tate, a mother of two young children, had been in an extended relationship with her children's father who physically abused her for two years. She was granted sole physical and legal custody of her children and, in a separate proceeding, obtained a civil order of protection 128 against the children's father. Shortly after she obtained the order, her ex-husband was imprisoned for violating the protection order when he went to her home, pushed her onto the floor, and threw some of her belongings out the window. Upon his release, he filed a motion to modify custody. An attorney was appointed for the child I29 and the case was referred for mediation, despite the domestic violence.
13o
The mother's counsel objected to mediation and the motion to modify custody was denied, as the legal standard of a "material change of circumstance[]" had not been met.
131
Despite denying the motion to modify custody, the master 132 viewed this as a "high confiict"m family who warranted extended court intervention. He modified the custody order to permit the father more time with the children, on the condition the father attend batterers' counseling. 134 The hearing examiner also set a series of review hearings, though no legal issues were pending.
135 At each subsequent hearing, the mother's behavior was scrutinized and the father gained more and more visitation without filing anything new and without complying with the court's previous order that he attend domestic violence counseling.136 The repeated hearings gave the father's attorney and the court appointed attorney for the child l37 the opportunity to argue the father's case over and over again to a series of judicial officers, none of whom fully understood the context of the case.
138
In the last review hearing, the master doubled the number of 132. In certain Family Law actions in Maryland, a "master" will hear domestic relations matters and has the power to regulate all proceedings in the hearing. MD. R. 9-208.
133. For a thorough discussion of the "high conflict family," see Coates et aI., supra note 50. This phrase has become a term of art in family courts. Used in that context, "high conflict" seems to be synonymous with "poor," and triggers greater and more sustained intervention by the courts.
134 (2000) . This study found a significant increase in the number of men who completed court ordered counseling programs for batterers when mandatory court review was implemented in the Pittsburgh Domestic Violence Court. The percentage of no-shows fell from 36% to 6% and total compliance rose by 35 %);
137. MD RULE 9-205.1 (governing appointment of child's counsel). 138. Family Law Clinic File, supra note 127.
overnight visitation immediately after the mother expressed her discomfort with the father taking the child to church. 139 The master also appeared to be sympathetic to the attorney for the child's position that the father should not have to "keep paying for the domestic violence" even though there was evidence of such violence within months of the court hearing and though the father had not participated in batterer's counseling, as ordered by the court. This series of reviews and changes in the existing child access order all happened with no motion pending, no notice of a potential change to the mother, and no evidentiary basis or record from which to seek review. The statewide legal services organization in a small suburban Maryland jurisdiction began to get complaints shortly after the establishment of a Family Division in that court. A new position had been created and filled for a "family court services coordinator." According to a high-ranking legal services lawyer who received reports from field attorneys in that jurisdiction, this coordinator, a nonlawyer with a background in human services, acted as though her position "gave her license to play God" with the lives of the low-income litigants who came before the court in which she served. 141 She heard reports that described the coordinator as "terrorizing unrepresented litigants, particularly young mothers, in child access cases.,,142 The coordinator was reported as regularly threatening young mothers with loss of their children and, in some cases, making arrangements to take their kids from them and place them with third parties; ordering random drug tests without court order; conducting custody "evaluations" which the parent never saw and testifying about the contents of such evaluations in child access cases; and engaging in ex parte contacts with at least one Family Division judge on the merits of family cases. All of these actions were taken without a court order or other express authority.
The court employee may have been well-intentioned in some instances, taking actions she believed were within her general authority 139. Id. 140. This illustration is drawn from interviews with a senior staff member at the Legal Aid Bureau to engage in "differentiated case management.,,143 But for the parents for whom contact with their children was at stake, these actions subjected them to broad violations of their privacy with no practical means to object. While many of the problems in this jurisdiction were connected to a single individual's inappropriate conduct,l44 they demonstrate the risks when courts embrace ambitious agendas to address problems beyond dispute resolution without clearly designated procedures, grants of authority or, in some cases, the resources to appropriately train or hire professional staff. As the supervising attorney described, "I think [these] stories exemplify a good idea run horribly amuck, and the need to find that often elusive balance between formalized legal procedures, including all of the due process protections we used to expect, and the desire to address the spectrum of issues poor family law litigants often have.,,145
III. REACHING THE GOAL OF A FULLY REALIZED ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN FAMILY LAW
The traditional adversary system has failed many family law litigants, particularly in contested cases involving children. As family court proponents have accurately noted, prevailing legal standards make family court proceedings primarily a backward-looking process, designed to assign blame and, as a result, add to the acrimony between parents. But, perhaps just as problematic, those same indeterminate standards make it difficult for parties to predict outcomes in court, and decrease the likelihood of reaching early and less costly agreements about child access and related issues. Even if agreements are eventually reached in most cases, parties spend enormous resources to lawyers, investigators, and other experts to prove the other parent unfit.
But even more critical, in terms of numbers of families affected and degree of harm, the traditional adversary system leaves vast numbers of unrepresented parties to navigate a court system structured with complex procedural and pleading rules. Often failure to understand these rules prevent access to the courts and a hearing on the merits. Even when such access is obtained, parties' inability to understand and use technical discovery and evidentiary rules makes it impossible to create a record upon which relief could be granted. If unrepresented parties are able to gather facts and present them in a way admissible in court, the broad 143. MD The problem-solving family court described in this Article is one response to the limits of the adversary system to resolve family cases in today's courts. But the new problem-solving courts do little to address the problems that most significantly contribute to the failure of the adversary system to protect children-indeterminate legal standards that encourage acrimony, delay, and expense for parents and lack of affordable sources of legal information and advice. And, by abandoning the long-held protections afforded litigants in the adversary system, the new courts make many families more vulnerable. The need for flexibility and a range of mUltidisciplinary actors to make decisions in the new courts creates a risk that some parties will unknowingly give up legal rights. In addition, ambitious efforts to educate, treat, and monitor families in conflict results in loss of privacy for families. The interventions and resultant loss of privacy may be unjustified in many cases. Even where some intervention may be helpful, the damage to family stability from the court's interference may outweigh any therapeutic benefits. And these risks to legal protections and family privacy fall disproportionately on the poor who most often fall under the state's scrutiny, including its courts.
Solutions lie in improving and sharpening the focus of the adversary system so it can better perform its dispute resolution functions, rather than abandoning it for a new one. This involves combining elements from a number of family law reform movements that have been developing independently over the last decade.
A. Improving the Legal Standard for Resolving Child Access Disputes
The legal framework for deciding family law cases has been subject to substantial critique over the last two decades. The most promising effort for improving the adversary system in family law cases is the movement away from broad legal standards to rules. 148 Standards in 146. For a detailed description of the experience of a typical pro se litigant in a family law case in the traditional adversary system, see Murphy, supra More recently, the "approximation standard" has been proposed as an alternative rule that continues to emphasize minimizing trauma by presuming parents will continue prebreakup caretaking roles but promotes an expanded role for the noncustodial parent. 154 This approach, which has been embraced in the ALI Principles,155 responds to many of the concerns about child custody proceedings in the adversary system under the best interests standard. Its relatively straightforward factual inquiry about parenting behavior should minimize the trauma of family breakup. It should also make court decisions more predictable, thus encouraging informed agreements in mediation and less costly trials when agreement is not reached. 156 For this reason, advocates for healthier and more therapeutic family dispute processes should advocate for its adoption.
B. Make Nonlegal Services Readily Available But Not Mandatory
In addition to substantive law changes, incorporating some elements of the problem solving approach into the adversary structure would improve the family dispute resolution system. Using dispute resolution to offer families needed services-educational, mental health, and financial-is a good idea. But it may be both impractical and Further, participation in most services should be voluntary, rather than a condition of receiving a legal remedy to which a party is otherwise entitled. 157 Services such as post judgment monitoring by a parent coordinator and, in the absence of unfitness, parenting education are more effective and less intrusive if desired by the parties receiving such support. At a minimum, a judicial officer should have to make clearly defined findings before compulsory services are ordered. Those administering such services should be properly trained, credentialed, and have legally defined authority .158
C. Improve the Quality of Family Mediation
Another element of the problem solving courts that needs to be preserved, but refined, is mediation. While mediation programs predated many family courts, the family court movement has made them a centerpiece of conflict resolution. 159 Mediation, combined with parenting plans,160 can offer families a private, perhaps less costly, 161
157. The imposition of services as a prerequisite to divorce may be subject to constitutional challenge. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 410 U.S. 371 (1971) (finding that because the state's regulation of marriage and divorce, in the generic sense, is an assumption of governmental power, the state cannot deny access to its courts for divorce by requiring a court fee from those who cannot pay).
158. 161. Many claim that mediation improves access to dispute resolution for the participants by giving parties the opportunity to resolve disputes with fewer costs.
The process is simple, communication is direct, and the formalities of court are discarded. Parties have more control over the process and can arrive at resolution of their disputes more quickly and without substantial time spent in court proceedings away from work and other responsibilities. See (1998) ( arguing that the poor should have access to court-sponsored alternative dispute resolution and not be "relegated" to the delays and expense of the adversarial system).
setting to plan for parenting of children after breakup. Mediation helps parties avoid the public acrimony of a trial and focus on common ground, thus preserving family relationships. Mediation might even offer a better alternative than the adversary system for accommodating diverse family traditions. Mediation's informality gives it the potential to address cultural differences in ways litigation may not. 162 Despite these advantages, the virtually unchecked risk that parties without lawyers will enter agreements without adequate information and advice makes the current widespread and often compulsory mediation of child access disputes troubling. Many of the current programs have no mechanism to ensure that unrepresented parties can obtain legal information or advice before, during, or after mediation. It is, therefore, risky to require low income and unrepresented litigants to use this process as an alternative to litigation to make informed agreements.
Other concerns about the unbridled enthusiasm for mediation of child access disputes include bias toward joint custody among some mediators l63 and the inadequacy of most court-sponsored programs to screen cases for domestic violence. l64 Responding to these risks and concerns does not require abandoning mediation in favor of trials in all cases. Instead, mediation can exist as an option in the adversary system if we develop a structure that provides resources to ensure individuals receive legal advice when needed during the mediation process. A range of solutions exist to address these issues from reconceiving the role of the mediator as including educating the parties about their legal rightsl65 to providing limited legal representation during mediation. 166
D. Guarantee Access to Legal Information, Advice, or Representation
The problem of lack of access to legal information is not limited to mediation, but pervades the family justice system. Judges, advocates, and scholars agree that the primary reason the traditional family justice 162 benefits,175 and employment and income maintenance.176 But advocacy for a right to counsel in civil cases has gathered particular momentum in the child access area. l77 Most argue for a right to counsel based on the constitutionally protected right to family privacyl78 or on procedural due process grounds in child access cases brought by the government. 179 Most of these arguments are grounded in federal constitutional claims, but some scholars 180 and courts 181 have framed arguments in terms of state constitutional law. Others have advocated for this right on the general principle that equal justice under law cannot exist where some parents are denied meaningful access to the courts because they cannot afford counsel. I82 Whatever the theory for insuring this right, the presence of counsel would have a profound effect in providing meaningful hearings in child access proceedings within the traditional adversary system, particularly if the standards governing child access cases were modified as this Article has proposed. 183 V. CONCLUSION Before we reject the adversary system for child access cases, we should evaluate its efficacy with the improvements this Article advocates. Reforming the substantive legal standard governing child access cases will assist parties in focusing on parenting in these proceedings instead of trying to meet the broad definition of unfitness inherent in the best interests standard. Further, the rule-based nature of the approximation or primary caretaker standard will assist parties in predicting outcomes if cases go to litigation, thus making it easier to evaluate agreements proposed in mediation. Making nonlegal services voluntary would limit the interference on family privacy. Finally, offering legal information and advice and, in some circumstances, full legal representation, would permit more informed use of alternative dispute resolution and a properly functioning adversary system. Justice can, indeed, be tempered with mercy if we work to improve, rather than abandon, the family justice system. the legislation itself recognizes how critical legal representation is to fully realizing the benefits of the adversary system:
The adversarial system of justice relied upon in the United States inevitably allocates to the parties the primary responsibility for discovering the relevant evidence, finding the relevant legal principles, and presenting them to a neutral judge or jury. Discharging these responsibilities generally requires the knowledge and skills of a legally trained professional. The absence of representation not only disadvantages parties, it has a negative effect on the functioning of the judicial system. When parties lack legal counsel, courts must cope with the need to provide guidance and assistance to ensure that the matter is properly administered and the parties receive a fair trial or hearing.
A.B. 590, 2009-20 10 Sess. § I (i) (Cal. 2009), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-I 0IbiIVasm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20091 0 ll_chaptered.pdf.
